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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court, which had original jurisdiction over this case pursuant
to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)j, transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals under U.C.A. 78-22(4). This Court has jurisdiction of the above-captioned case pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1
May a defendant who settles out of a lawsuit subsequently institute an action
against a co-defendant for contribution to recover a portion of the amount the first defendant
paid out in a settlement?
ISSUE #2
Must claims by defendants against co-defendants for apportionment of fault be
asserted in the original lawsuit?
ISSUE #3
Does the need for a defendant to assert a claim for apportionment of fault in the
original lawsuit rather than as a subsequent contribution action present any constitutional
problems of due process?
ISSUE #4
Should this court recognize a cause of action for "comparative implied
indemnity"?
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ISSUE #5
Does res judicata bar plaintiffs claim for implied indemnity in this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES
Because the trial court decided these issues as a matter of law, this court should
review the trial court's conclusions for correctness. State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 565
(Utah App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDERLYING THE ORIGINAL SUIT
The statement of facts which follows provides a background regarding the course
of proceedings and disposition of claims in the original lawsuit arising out of this dispute and
the appeal of the trial court's decision in that suit. National Services Industries, Inc. ("NSI")
has likewise attached to its Brief of Appellant a "Statement of Facts Underlying the First
Appeal." Brief of Appellant at Addendum 4. An understanding of the course of proceedings
in the original lawsuit is important to this appeal as NSI asserts as a basis for some of its
claims in this appeal the way in which its claims were handled in the original suit. The
following fact paragraphs contain citations to the Record on appeal in this case where
possible. Like NSI's "Statement of Facts Underlying the First Appeal," a few of the fact
paragraphs in this statement of facts contain citations to the depositions of witnesses in the
original suit.
1.

The instant action filed by plaintiff NSI arises out of a prior lawsuit filed by

Sherman D. Packer ("Packer") v. NSI, B.W. Norton ("Norton"), and International Machine
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and Tool Works ("International"). (R. pp. 3, 56-57). Defendants NSI and Norton answered
and defended the allegations asserted by Packer in the underlying action. Although named,
International was never served with process. (R. p. 57).
2.

Packer alleged that on October 7, 1988, he purchased four products from

NSI, one of those products being NSI's high foam degreaser. Packer further alleged that the
high foam degreaser was packaged in a 7-gallon metal can manufactured by Norton with a
pour spout and lid manufactured by defendant International. (R. p. 57).
3.

Packer claimed that the metal container contained a metal pour spout with a

lid that indicated that one was to "pry out" the metal lid to open the container. Packer
alleged that as he attempted to do so, the small metal lid suddenly exploded outward, striking
him in the right eye. (R. p. 57).
4.

Packer then sought recovery from defendants Norton and NSI based upon

strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. (R. p. 57).
5.

Defendant NSI did not file a cross-claim against defendant Norton. (R. p.

6.

Defendant Norton manufactured the 7-gallon metal can at issue. The pour

57).

spout and the lid were manufactured by defendant International.
7.

NSI selected the type of metal can it desired and ordered it from Norton.

Norton then supplied the metal can, the pour spout, and the lid to NSI.
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8.

NSI purchased the 7-gallon pails from Norton in bulk and NSI itself made

the determination at one of its three facilities what finished product would be placed into
each pail. [Deposition of Manuel N. Fineman, Ph.D., p. 81]
9.

NSI never consulted with Norton in respect to the particular type of product

that would be put in the container.
Q.

To your knowledge, did you ever - "you" meaning Zep [NSI] in San Jose,
ever advise or consult with Norton as to what particular products you are
going to use in any particular shipment of pails?

A.

No.

[Deposition of T. Spencer Graham, p. 73]
10. Plaintiff theorizes that the accident was caused by pressure build-up in the
inside of the container which was adequate to propel the inner seal to a velocity likely to
have caused the injury which plaintiff suffered. Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Noel de
Nevers, has opined that the probable cause of the pressure in the container was a release of
dissolved air from the contents of the container. [Deposition of Dr. Noel de Nevers, pp. 89]
11. Norton was never informed by anyone at NSI that the materials placed in
any of the steel pails would create any vapor pressure or head space pressure. [Graham
Depo., p. 75.] NSI never advised Norton that these particular pails needed to be pressure
vessels. [Dr. Fineman Depo., p. 83.]
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12. The design on the outside of the Norton pail supplied to NSI is generic so
that paper labels can be applied to the pail by NSI, depending on what material is placed in
the pail. [Graham Depo., p. 80-81.]
13. The vice president of NSI in charge of handling claims and lawsuits, and
the previous vice president of research and development of NSI, has indicated that he has no
information that would indicate that there was anything wrong with the steel pails that were
used in the batch of which this product was part of. [Dr. Fineman Depo., pp. 5, 81-82.]
14. Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Noel de Nevers, has not formed any opinions
to the effect that the products supplied to NSI from Norton were defective. [Dr. de Nevers
Depo., pp. 8-9.]
15. Defendant Norton filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there
was no evidence that the products manufactured or supplied by Norton to NSI were
defective. Packer did not oppose the motion. However, NSI did submit an opposition
memorandum. The trial court, after hearing oral argument and considering NSI's
memorandum, granted Norton's motion for summary judgment. (R. p. 58).
16. After defendant Norton was dismissed from the action, defendant NSI
settled the case. (R. p. 58).
17. Defendant NSI appealed the trial court's granting of Norton's motion for
summary judgment in the underlying action. (R. p. 58). The Utah Court of Appeals held
that NSI, as a non-adverse co-defendant, did not have standing to appeal the award of
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summary judgment in favor of Norton. See Packer v. National Service Industries, 909 P.2d
1277, 1278 (Utah App.1996).
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO THIS APPEAL
1.

NSI filed the instant action against Norton to recover a portion of the

amount NSI agreed to pay Packer to settle the case. NSI's complaint stated four causes of
action styled "Proportionate Fault," "Negligence," "Strict Liability" and "Breach of
Warranty." (R. pp. 003-006).
2.

Norton moved to dismiss each of NSI's stated causes of action for failure to

state a claim.

The trial court dismissed NSI's causes of action for "proportionate fault" and

"negligence," holding that such claims sought contribution from Norton. (R. p. 164).
3.

The trial court construed NSI's claims for "breach of warranty" and "strict

liability" as seeking full indemnity rather than contribution and treated Norton's motion to
dismiss these claims as a motion for summary judgment. After considering additional
briefing on this motion, the trial court granted Norton's motion for summary judgment on
these claims, holding that such claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata given the
holding in the original suit that Norton was free of fault as a matter of law. (R. p. 166).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

A DEFENDANT WHO HAS SETTLED OUT OF A CASE MAY NOT
SUBSEQUENTLY INSTITUTE AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION
AGAINST A CO-DEFENDANT TO RECOVER A PORTION OF THE
SETTLEMENT
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The purpose of the Utah Tort Reform Act is not merely to ensure that the
proportionate fault of all parties is determined at some point, but to ensure that it is
determined in a single action. The Act accomplishes this goal by abrogating the old rule of
joint and several liability among co-defendants with subsequent contribution suits in favor of
apportionment of fault among all parties in the first instance. The Act does not, therefore, as
appellant NSI contends, "allow a settling party to sue for 'reimbursement'" of a portion of
the settlement amount in a separate subsequent action. Brief of Appellant at 19. Such an
action would be a classic contribution suit. On the contrary, the Utah Tort Reform Act
expressly bans such suits. See U.C.A. § 78-27-40.
II.

A CROSS CLAIM FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT MUST BE
BROUGHT IN THE ORIGINAL SUIT GIVEN THE UTAH TORT REFORM
ACT'S BAN ON CONTRIBUTION SUITS.
Under the Utah Tort Reform Act, the relative fault of co-defendants is always

determined in one proceeding. A defendant is not automatically in a position, however, to
oppose or appeal a co-defendant's motion for summary judgment because co-defendants are
not adverse parties. As noted above, such a co-defendant is likewise barred by the Utah Tort
Reform Act from instituting a later action seeking contribution from a co-defendant who
obtains summary judgment and is dismissed. Thus, if a defendant wishes to put himself in a
position to have standing to oppose or appeal a finding of no fault on the part of a codefendant, he must assert a cross claim against that co-defendant in the original action for
apportionment of fault. This is true notwithstanding the fact that the general rule regarding
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cross claims states that they are permissive. The general rule regarding cross claims cannot,
through reverse implication, grant NSI the right to file a subsequent suit seeking contribution
when the Utah Tort Reform Act clearly and unequivocally bans such actions.
HI.

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST BRINGING CONTRIBUTION SUITS TO
RECOVER MONEY PAID PURSUANT TO JUDGMENTS OR
SETTLEMENTS IS CLEARLY STATED IN THE UTAH CODE AND
THEREFORE PRESENTS NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF DUE
PROCESS OR LACK OF NOTICE
The Utah Tort Reform Act scheme described above does not, as NSI contends,

present any constitutional problems of due process or lack of notice as the Tort Reform Act's
prohibition of contribution suits is clearly stated in section 78-27-40 of the Utah Code.
Additionally, NSI has not been left with "no remedy" or opportunity to be heard
in this case. NSI filed a memorandum in opposition to Norton's motion for summary
judgment in the original action. This memorandum, as well as NSI's oral arguments, were
considered by the court in ruling on Norton's motion for summary judgment. Aside from
taking advantage of this opportunity, there were several other avenues NSI simply chose not
to pursue in handling its case.
IV.

THE "COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" CAUSE OF ACTION
SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED BY THIS COURT
The cause of action for "comparative implied indemnity" recognized in a few

jurisdictions does not allow a party such as NSI to assert claims for partial reimbursement in
a subsequent action as NSI now attempts to do. Recognition of "comparative implied
indemnity" would therefore not assist NSI and the instant case does not present an
8

appropriate situation for the adoption of such a cause of action. Furthermore, even if
"comparative implied indemnity" did allow a party to assert a claim for partial
reimbursement in a separate lawsuit, it would merely allow suits for contribution and conflict
directly with the Utah Tort Reform Act's unambiguous prohibition of contribution suits. The
"comparative implied indemnity" cause of action should therefore not be recognized by this
court.
V.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY IS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF
THIS CLAIM WAS FULLY BRIEFED AND LITIGATED BETWEEN NSI
AND NORTON IN ANOTHER LAWSUIT AND RESOLVED ON THE
MERITS IN NORTON'S FAVOR
The cause of action for implied indemnity, which may be asserted in a separate

subsequent action, requires that NSI be free of fault and that Norton be one-hundred percent
at fault. In the instant case, the lack of any fault on the part of defendant Norton has already
been determined as a matter of law in the original suit. NSI's oral arguments and
memorandum in opposition to Norton's summary judgment motion were considered by the
court in the original action in response to Norton's motion for summary judgment. NSI's
present action for implied indemnity is therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A PLAINTIFF WHO HAS SETTLED OUT OF A CASE MAY NOT
SUBSEQUENTLY INSTITUTE AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION
AGAINST A CO-DEFENDANT TO RECOVER A PORTION OF THE
SETTLEMENT
9

Prior to the enactment of the Utah Tort Reform Act, co-defendants in a lawsuit
could be held jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs damages. The plaintiff could then
pursue collection of one-hundred percent of its damages against any single defendant. A
defendant paying the full amount of the judgment could then initiate new lawsuits against its
co-defendants for contribution seeking a determination as to the relative fault of the codefendants and reimbursement for that portion of the judgment or settlement paid by the
defendant for which the co-defendants were responsible.
The purpose of the Utah Tort Reform Act is to ensure that the ultimate
determination as to the relative fault of defendants occurs in a single proceeding so that joint
and several liability and subsequent suits for contribution are unnecessary. The Act
accomplishes this goal by abrogating the old rule of joint and several liability, mandating
liability according to proportionate fault, and prohibiting suits for contribution. The Act
provides:
Section 78-27-40. Amount of Liability Limited to Proportion of
Fault — No Contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage
or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is
entitled to contribution from any other person.
U.C.A. § 78-27-40 [emphasis added].
The Act does not, therefore, as appellant NSI contends, "allow a settling party to
sue for 'reimbursement'" of a portion of the settlement amount in a separate subsequent
10

action. Brief of Appellant at 19. Such an action is a classic contribution suit unequivocally
banned by the Act.
In the original lawsuit in which NSI and Norton were co-defendants, NSI
voluntarily settled with plaintiff Sherman Packer. (R. p. 58) The money paid by NSI
pursuant to that settlement represents the only damages which NSI now claims in the instant
case. (R. p.3-6). NSI now attempts in its First and Second Causes of Action to seek
reimbursement from Norton of a portion of the settlement paid by NSI in the underlying
action (the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Warranty and Fourth Cause of Action for
Strict Liability were construed by the lower court to be claims for full indemnity).
These claims asserted by NSI are therefore textbook contribution claims. Black's
Law Dictionary defines contribution as the "[r]ight of one who has discharged a common
liability to recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear."
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), p.328. NSI alleges that Norton is partly liable for
Packer's injuries despite Norton's being awarded summary judgment in the underlying
action, and seeks contribution from Norton of a portion of the settlement it agreed to pay
Packer. NSI argues that its "complaint never requests contribution," but rather seeks
"reimbursement." However, NSI cannot escape the application of U.C.A. § 78-27-40 by
simply renaming its cause of action.
NSI argues that U.C.A § 78-27-37 somehow "authorizes" the kind of suit for
"reimbursement" it attempts to bring. The section of the Act cited by NSI containing the

11

word "reimbursement" is merely in the "Definitions" section of the Tort Reform Act setting
forth the definition of "Person seeking recovery" as used throughout the Act. See Brief of
Appellant at 19 (citing U.C.A. § 78-27-37) [reproduced in "Addendum 1" in the Brief of
Appellant]. A Definitions section, however, merely defines the words and phrases used in
an Act. The section cited by NSI does not grant substantive rights or create causes of action,
and certainly does not "authorize" suits for contribution. There is no reason to believe the
mere use of the word "reimbursement" in the definition of "Person seeking recovery"
somehow authorizes suits for contribution in total contravention of the unambiguous
abolishment of such suits in § 78-27-40, a substantive provision of the Act.
NSI cites Sullivan v. Scoular Grain. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) to support its
assertion that the definition of "Persons seeking recovery" authorizes a cause of action for
contribution. Brief of Appellant at 20. NSI states that Sullivan held that the Definitions
section of the Act embraces "employers and their insurance carriers, under the Worker's
Compensation Act, as such persons seeking reimbursement." This is exactly right and is the
reason NSI's reliance on Sullivan is so misplaced. Employers and insurance carriers in the
context of Worker's Compensation Act claims are not in the position of discharging any
shared or "common liability" as described in the definition of "contribution" cited above.
Employers and insurance carriers in this context do not seek payment from others for their
proportionate share of some shared fault, but rather step into the shoes of an injured party
and assume their right to recover from the negligent party. In other words, they pursue
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subrogated interests. They do not seek "reimbursement" of the variety that NSI now seeks,
which is simply classic contribution. Thus, use of the word "reimbursement" in the
definition of "Persons seeking recovery" merely ensures that suits such as subrogation claims
by insurance carriers are embraced by the Tort Reform Act. Such suits for "reimbursement"
are nothing like the contribution suit being brought by NSI in this case. Contribution actions
are expressly and unambiguously abolished in § 78-27-40, and use of the word
"reimbursement" to account for subrogation claims in the "Definitions" section of the Act in
no way conflicts with that abolishment.
NSI correctly notes that the purpose of the Tort Reform Act is to "ensure that 'no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion
of fault attributable to that defendant.'" Brief of Appellant at 20 (quoting Sullivan, 853 P.2d
at 880). NSI, however, misreads the statute with regard to how this goal is accomplished.
The purpose of the Act is to abrogate the old system of joint and several liability with
contribution suits in favor of apportionment of fault in the one proceeding. This avoids
parties being held liable for damages in excess of fault, thus obviating the need for any
subsequent contribution suits. If a party bears no fault, however, then there is no need for
apportionment. As the Sullivan court noted: "[w]hen a defendant is dismissed due to a
determination of fault as a matter of law, the defendant's exclusion from apportionment does
not subject the remaining defendants to liability for damages in excess of their proportion of
fault." Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878. This is precisely what occurred in the underlying action

13

in this case. Norton was determined to lack fault as a matter of law and was granted
summary judgment. (R. p. 58, 165) (Order granting Summary Judgment at 4).
The key point, however, is that whether Norton bears any fault in this case or
not, the only party able to recover damages from Norton for that fault under the new system
is the plaintiff in the underlying case, Sherman Packer. A co-defendant like NSI may not
voluntarily pay more than its share of damages in a settlement agreement and then pursue
another co-defendant for "reimbursement" of part of that amount in another action as NSI
now attempts to do. If NSI paid for more than its share of fault in settling with the plaintiff,
that is simply a mistake that NSI must live with.
NSI may choose to refer to its suit as a permissive cross claim, a suit for
"reimbursement," or anything else for that matter, but it is a classic suit for contribution.
Contribution suits have been abolished by § 78-27-40, and NSFs complaint therefore fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The decision of the trial court must therefore
be affirmed.
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POINT n
A CROSS CLAIM FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT MUST BE
BROUGHT IN THE ORIGINAL SUIT GIVEN THE UTAH TORT REFORM
ACT'S BAN ON CONTRIBUTION SUITS
As noted above, the Utah Tort Reform Act ensures that the relative fault of codefendants is always determined at trial by mandating liability in proportion to fault and
prohibiting subsequent contribution suits. The relative fault of co-defendants is thus always
determined in a single proceeding.
As was determined in the other appeal in this dispute, however, a defendant is
not automatically in a position to oppose or appeal a co-defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of proportionate fault because co-defendants are not adverse parties.
Packer v. National Service Industries, 909 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Utah App. 1996). This does
not in any way affect the normal rule that fault is always apportioned among joint tortfeasors
and no defendant will bear more than their proportionate share of fault. It means, however,
as NSI notes in Point I of its brief and as this court noted in Packer, that a defendant who
wishes to give itself standing to oppose or appeal a co-defendant's motion for summary
judgment may assert a cross claim for apportionment of fault against that co-defendant.
Brief of Appellant at 13 (citing Packer, 909 P.2d at 1278).
Given the Utah Tort Reform Act's express and unequivocal ban on all
contribution suits, however, a defendant wishing to assert such a claim for "apportionment of
fault" must do so in the original action and not wait to bring the claim in another lawsuit.
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Thus, despite the rule that cross claims are generally permissive, a cross claim for
apportionment offault must be brought in the original suit by operation of the Utah Tort
Reform Act's ban on contribution suits. The general rule regarding the permissive nature of
cross claims cannot, through reverse implication, grant NSI an affirmative substantive right
to file a separate contribution suit when no such right exists under the law and when such
contribution suits are expressly and unequivocally banned by statute. NSI cannot bootstrap
its way around an unambiguous statutory ban on contribution suits by relying on the general
rule on cross claims.
To allow cross claims for apportionment of fault to be brought in subsequent
actions would simply be to allow contribution suits in direct contravention of U.C.A. § 7827-40. The trial court's dismissal of NSI's First and Second causes of action must therefore
be affirmed.
POINT III
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST BRINGING CONTRIBUTION SUITS TO
RECOVER MONEY PAID PURSUANT TO JUDGMENTS OR
SETTLEMENTS IS CLEARLY STATED IN THE UTAH CODE AND
THEREFORE PRESENTS NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF DUE
PROCESS OR LACK OF NOTICE
The Utah Tort Reform Act scheme described above does not, as NSI contends,
present any constitutional problems of due process or lack of notice as the Tort Reform Act's
prohibition of contribution suits is clearly stated in section 78-27-40 of the Utah Code.
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NSI argues that if indeed it was required to assert any claims for apportionment
of fault in the original action, "notice must be given to litigants of that fact." Brief of
Appellant at 28. NSI then states that "[t]he rule on cross claims does not give notice" of this
fact and that "case law and commentators do not inform litigants" of this fact either. NSI
then contends that such lack of notice results in unconstitutional deprivations of due process
rights. Brief of Appellant at 28-29. What NSI chooses to overlook, however, is that while
"the rule [13f], the case law, [and] the commentators" do not put litigants on notice that
claims for apportionment must be asserted in the original suit rather than brought later as
separate suits for contribution, the Utah Code certainly does provide such notice. The Utah
Code provides very clear notice of this fact in its express prohibition on contribution suits in
section 78-27-40. There is therefore no lack of notice to litigants that they will be prevented
from pursuing co-defendants in subsequent actions seeking reimbursement of funds paid out
in settlements or in satisfaction of judgments. NSFs inability to now sue Norton for
contribution therefore presents no constitutional problems and the decision of the trial court
must be upheld.
NSI's argument that it will have been left with "no remedy" if it is prohibited
from now asserting a claim for contribution is likewise groundless. Despite NSFs attempt to
characterize the history of this case in a way which suggests that Norton's fault has never
been determined, the issue has in fact already been adjudicated. As discussed more fully in
Point V, below, the court in the original action determined as a matter of law that Norton

17

bore no fault in this case. In ruling on Norton's summary judgment motion, the court
considered an opposition memorandum as well as oral arguments presented by NSI. NSI
was therefore given, and took advantage of, an opportunity to be heard on this issue.
Furthermore, NSI was presented with, but simply chose not to take advantage of, several
other opportunities to prosecute their case. NSI could have asserted its claim for
apportionment of fault against Norton as a cross claim but chose not to do so. NSI could
likewise have asserted a cross claim against defendant International, the company that
manufactured the injury-producing part in this case. NSI could also have proceeded to trial,
defended its interests, and had its fault apportioned with International. NSI instead chose to
place a price tag on its own liability in this case and enter into a settlement with plaintiff,
thereby foregoing the opportunities discussed above.
Aside form foregoing several opportunities in the original action, it should also
be noted that NSI could now pursue International, the company which manufactured the
injury-producing lid in this case, for indemnity. NSI has named International in its
complaint in this case, but has apparently never served International with process and is not
pursuing them.
Given the numerous opportunities NSI has chosen to forego in the handling of its
case, as well as the fact that NSI did in fact oppose Norton's motion for summary judgment
and was heard on this issue in the original action, NSI cannot claim to have been left with
"no remedy" or opportunity to be heard. NSI chose to forego other avenues in favor of
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placing a price tag on its own liability and settling with Packer. If NSI agreed to pay more
than its share of damages in settling with the plaintiff, this is simply a mistake that NSI must
now live with. NSI's inability to now bring a suit for contribution against Norton presents
no constitutional problems of lack of due process or access to the courts, and the trial court's
dismissal of NSI's claims for contribution must be affirmed.
POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
"COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT
AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE, BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO
CLEAR UTAH STATUTORY LAW, AND BECAUSE SUCH A CLAIM
WOULD BE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA IN ANY CASE
A.

Recognition of "comparative implied indemnity" would not assist NSI or
affect the outcome of this case

NSI argues that if the Utah Tort Reform Act does not allow suits for partial
reimbursement subsequent to settlement of a case, this court should recognize the cause of
action for "comparative implied indemnity" as adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in
Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1980). Brief of Appellant at 25-26. In
Kennedy, the court recognized a form of "comparative implied indemnity" which allows a
settling products liability defendant to pursue non-settling defendants for a portion of the
settlement amount. Importantly, however, under "comparative implied indemnity" as
adopted in Kennedy, this apportionment is to occur in the original suit and not in a later
action. The Kennedy court, noting that Kansas' legislature, like Utah's, intended to
encourage "resolution of all issues in a single action," made clear that apportionment of fault
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under "comparative implied indemnity" is to occur "in the action which was pending
between plaintiff and defendants when the compromise and settlement was accomplished"
and not in a subsequent action. Kennedy, 618 P.2d at 802-03. The Kennedy court held that
only "[i]f a settlement has been made for all liability arising from the occurrence before a
comparative negligence action has been filed, the settling tortfeasor may then and in that
event file an action in court to have the degrees of responsibility among joint tortfeasors
determined." Id. at 803. In the instant case, NSI settled out of the case after the lawsuit
had been filed, and therefore may not, even under "comparative implied indemnity" as
recognized in Kennedy, now file a separate action. Thus, even if "comparative implied
indemnity" were recognized by this court as NSI urges, it would not assist NSI in this case.
B.

To the extent that "comparative implied indemnity" would allow NSI to
assert a claim for partial reimbursement of the settlement amount in a
subsequent lawsuit, it is directly contrary to the Utah Code's express
prohibition of contribution suits and must not be recognized

If "comparative implied indemnity" did allow claims for partial reimbursement to
be brought in subsequent actions after settlements were made, it would merely authorize
classic contribution suits. This court should therefore not recognize such a cause of action
because it conflicts directly with the Utah Tort Reform Act's unambiguous prohibition of
contribution suits.
To the extent that "comparative implied indemnity" does allow for subsequent
actions for partial reimbursement of judgments or settlements, it is merely a form of
contribution prohibited by statute in Utah. In its discussion, the Kennedy court recognizes
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that the cause of action it adopts is indeed a form of contribution. The Kennedy court notes
the cause of action for "implied indemnity," which is recognized in Utah, is only
distinguishable from classic contribution in that it seeks full reimbursement for one-hundred
percent of damages rather than a portion thereof:
Traditional implied indemnity, such as that sought by the city in this
case, implies a shifting of 100% of a loss from the indemnitee to the
indemnitor. In this respect it is distinguishable from "contribution,"
which contemplates a shift of only part of the loss to another.
Id. At 799. The Kennedy court then goes on to adopt "comparative implied indemnity" in
products liability cases allowing for reimbursement of only a portion of damages paid (a
contribution suit). In so doing, the Kennedy court notes that this cause of action has actually
been referred to alternatively as "'comparative contribution' or 'comparative indemnity.'"
Id,
As noted above, the very purpose of the Utah Tort Reform Act is to abrogate
joint and several liability, to ensure that apportionment of fault among co-defendants occurs
in one lawsuit, and to eliminate subsequent contribution suits. Adopting a "comparative
implied indemnity" cause of action which allows subsequent suits for partial reimbursement
of settlement amounts from co-defendants is thus totally contrary to the purpose of the Utah
Tort Reform Act. Not only would adopting such a cause of action be contrary to the
underlying purpose of the Act, but it would in fact directly conflict with the Act's express
and unambiguous abolishment of all contribution suits. See U.C.A. § 78-27-40.
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It should be noted that Kansas' comparative negligence act, K.S.A. § 60-258a,
unlike Utah's, does not expressly ban contribution suits. It is because contribution suits have
been expressly and unequivocally prohibited by statute in Utah that only suits for full implied
indemnity, adopted in Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App.1988),
are permissible in Utah. NSI contends that Utah's recognition of only the "implied
indemnity" cause of action "violates the very intent of the Tort Reform Statute." Brief of
Appellant at 24. This current scheme, however, actually enforces the intent of the Tort
Reform Act by not allowing suits for recovery of only a portion of an adverse judgment or
settlement (contribution suits). If there is any inequity in this scheme, it is an inequity
which the legislature, and not this court, must address given the Utah Code's unequivocal
ban on contribution suits.
C.

Any claim by NSI for "comparative implied indemnity" would be barred by
res judicata in this case because Norton's lack of fault has already been
determined as a matter of law

As discussed more fully below, the issue of Norton's proportionate share of fault
has already been decided on the merits. Norton was found to be free of any fault in this case
whatsoever. Any attempt by NSI to relitigate Norton's proportionate share of fault in order
to recover a portion of the settlement amount would therefore be barred by res judicata even
if such a contribution suit were permitted.

22

POINT V
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY IS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF
THIS CLAIM WAS FULLY BRIEFED AND LITIGATED BETWEEN NSI
AND NORTON IN ANOTHER LAWSUIT AND RESOLVED ON THE
MERITS IN NORTON'S FAVOR
The cause of action for implied indemnity, which may be asserted in a separate
subsequent action, requires that the plaintiff be free of fault and that the defendant be onehundred percent at fault. In the instant case, the lack of any fault on the part of defendant
Norton has already been determined as a matter of law in the original suit. NSFs oral
arguments and memorandum in opposition to Norton's summary judgment motion were
considered by the court in the original action in ruling on Norton's motion for summary
judgment. NSFs present action for implied indemnity is therefore barred by the doctrine of
res judicata and the trial court's granting of Norton's motion for summary judgment was
proper.
As noted by NSI, Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft, 758 P.2d 443 (Ut.App.1988)
established the cause of action for implied indemnity in Utah. The implied indemnity cause
of action is available in products liability cases to "passive suppliers, distributors, and
retailers" who are entirely without fault and through whom a product defectively
manufactured by another merely passes without change. IcL at 445-46. Aside from
requiring that the implied indemnity plaintiff be free of fault, the Hanover court also made
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clear that the "manufacturer must have introduced a defective product into the stream of
commerce." Hanover, 758 P.2d at 448.
In the instant case, it has already been determined that NSI was not a passive,
pass-through retailer of a completed defective product. Instead, NSI, selected and ordered a
metal can and lid from Norton without informing Norton of the purposes for which such
component parts would be used. Next, the "steel pail in question was received by NSI in its
component parts in a generic painted condition. NSI packaged the Hi-Foam Degreaser
product in the pail, closed the container and then applied its own warning and instruction
label to the pail without consulting Norton in the process." Order granting Summary
Judgment at 3. [attached hereto as Addendum 1] Because it has already been held that NSI
was not a passive retailer of the defective container, but rather constructed the container out
of components sold by Norton, NSI's is prevented by res judicata from demonstrating the
first required element of an implied indemnity claim. With respect to the second requirement
that NSI demonstrate that Norton introduced a defective product into the marketplace, this
too has already been decided as a matter of law. The original trial court held that "[a]t the
time the pail left Norton, it was not in a defective condition." Order granting Summary
Judgment at 4. Thus, NSI is prevented by res judicata from demonstrating another required
element of its implied indemnity claims against Norton.
The Hanover court held that the implied indemnity prerequisite of demonstrating
that the manufacturer sold a defective product actually "requires a factual finding of liability
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on the part of the manufacturer." IcL In the instant case, however, the complete reverse is
true. The original trial court held specifically that Norton bore no fault whatsoever and was
not liable. The Hanover court made clear that "if a retailer has been forced to defend a suit
where it is ultimately found the manufacturer did not produce a defective product, there is no
right to indemnification." Hanover, 758 P.2d at 448. As noted above, this is precisely the
case here.
NSI argues that res judicata is inapplicable in this case because its "claims were
never heard" and "no judgment was entered." Brief of Appellant at 22. This is clearly
false. NSI filed a memorandum in opposition to Norton's motion for summary judgment and
presented oral argument as well. The trial court in the original suit considered NSI's brief
and arguments on their merits in ruling on Norton's summary judgment motion. The issue
of Norton's share of fault has thus clearly been briefed, argued and litigated between NSI
and Norton. With respect to NSI's claim that no judgment has been entered, the trial court
in the original case clearly entered an order granting Norton's motion for summary judgment
and holding that Norton bore no percentage of fault in this case.
The instant case simply does not present a situation in which a cause of action for
implied indemnity can lie. The elements of this cause of action were clearly defined in
Hanover. Two of these elements have already been briefed, argued and litigated between
NSI and Norton and determined as a matter of law to be absent from this case. This court
should therefore uphold the trial court's granting of Norton's motion for summary judgment
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on NSI's third and fourth causes of action on the basis that they are barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order of Dismissal and
Summary Judgment in this case should be affirmed.
DATED this / ^ d a v of November, 1996.
STRONG/&HANNI

' Paul M. Belnap
'
Robert L. Janicki
Michael S. Johnson
Attorneys for Defendant
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Co.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this /{7

day of November, 1996, to the following:

Todd S. Winegar
Wade S. Winegar
POWELL & LANG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
110 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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/ ttorneys for Defendant
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc.
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NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC.,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

Civil No. 950900951
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
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The above-entitled matter came before the court on the motion to dismiss of B.W. Norton
Manufacturing Company, Inc. on September 1, 1995. The court having reviewed the memoranda
submitted prior to that hearing and having considered oral argument of counsel presented at the
hearing determined as a matter of law that the first and second causes of action in the plaintiffs
complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted since the causes of action in
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substance requested relief by way of contributionfromdefendant Norton to the settlement made by
the plaintiff to the plaintiff Sherman Packer in the Packer v. National Service Industries, Inc. et aL
Civil No. 920902466 (hereinafter Packer litigation).
The Court indicated it thought the third and fourth causes of action should be dismissed
based on res judicata, but that it was not properly before the Court as a motion for summary
judgment. Rather than force a refiling of a second similar motion, counsel for NSI agreed that the
court could consider Norton's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on the third and
fourth causes of action, with each party to submit an additional brief.
Accordingly, the court considered the additional legal briefing submitted and reviewed the
judgmentfromthe Packer litigation and in that regard determined that the Packer litigation resulted
in a final judgment in favor of B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter Norton).
On September 12,1994, the court in the Packer litigation entered a summary judgment order
dismissing the claims of the plaintiff Packer brought against Norton.
NSI had opposed the summary judgment of Norton in the Packer litigation and the court had
considered the arguments of NSI.
This court determines that the issues raised by NSI in the instant case are barred by res
judicata doctrine as that principle had been established by appellate level courts in this state in cases
including D'Astin v. Astin, 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992), Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d
303, 305 (Utah 1985), and Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
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Accordingly, this court determines that claims one and two of the plaintiff fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and further that claims three and four of the plaintiff are barred by
res judicata in that the issues were litigated or could have been litigated in the Packer litigation
between the same parties who are now before this court and said issues have been determined in a
final judgment on the merits in the Packer litigation.
For good cause appearing, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the motion to dismiss of Norton
is granted and further, this court dismiss claims one and two of NSI as a matter of law, and grants
summary judgment of claims three and U an tor the reasons stated abo\ e ind also covered in this
court's Minute Entry of October 16,1995, and therefore the claims of the plaintifFNSI are dismissed
against the defendant B. W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., with prejudice.
DATED this JjD

day of Wgvombor 1995r-

/

BY THE COUJO"

Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Todd S. Winegar
Counsel for NSI

